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Man is a being who has the ability to split: he establishes 
the difference between himself and the image of himself. 
Between what he does and what he could do. Between his 
present existence and the existence he hopes for. In other 
words, he is a depicting creature, he bears in his mind 
representations about himself and the world, which 
remain somewhat remote from reality, although he may 
want to match it to him (Delsol, 2011, p. 88) 
 
Abstract 
Awareness of mortality is one of the key aspects of human existence. Death goes beyond the boundary of 
knowledge, mortality. However, it is actually experienced by man as something inevitable. Death is a fact – the 
end of life, and the experience of mortality is one of the borderline situations. In the essay, the author puts 
forward the thesis that the experience of mortality has a significant impact on the human understanding of 
values. Attitudes towards death be it fear, resignation, indifference, fascination, mourning, sadness, despair after 
the loss of a loved one, or the desire for death, indicate the wealth of the world of value of axiological 
experience. The attitude of the person towards death, in some sense, is a test of our humanity, the principal value 
to which we refer most often. The author of the essay adopts the position of axiological relationalism (or 
axiological structurism), it implies that values are independent of the subject, they form a network of relational 
connections, but they are in a significant way connected with culture. The study of these connections: 1) with the 
world of people, 2) world of things, 3) internal relations that take place between values, allows us to get to know 
the complex structure of the world of values. In the article, the author analyzes in what sense mortality 
influences human understanding of values. 
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The issue of death and mortality can be analyzed in many ways. In this article, the author 
wants to look at the issue from the axiological perspective. Death is a biological fact, in this 
sense it is inevitable for a human being. However, it is also something mysterious to us. Death 
is a mystery, a borderline aspect of human finitude, it cannot be directly presented to us, let 
alone indicate what happens to us after death. To express this helplessness, we often use the 
language of symbols and metaphorical approximations (Cichowicz, 1993, pp. 9–10). 
Here we neither analyze the immortality of the human soul, nor the life of this soul after 
death. We are interested in death as a borderline experience, something that will happen for 
sure, but not yet. Considering biological life, we can influence the prolongation of lifespan 
through specific pharmacological, technical and genetic actions. Then the main problem is not 
the length of life, but the quality of life of an aging body. Some hopes for maintaining the 
quality of life are associated with biological and technical interference into the aging process
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and the decline of life’s abilities. These types of futuristic visions are related to, inter alia, the 
transhumanism trend (Grabowski, 2015, p. 25).  
Representatives of this trend postulate the use of science, technology, and now also 
neuroscience, biotechnology and nanotechnology to cross the boundaries imposed by biology. 
They postulate improvement in the quality of human life, and sometimes equipping it with 
some additional physical and intellectual skills (Kurzwail, 2013, pp. 23–45). When we reject 
the dependence between the human condition and death, we succumb to the civilizational 
illusion that the end of life is only accidental, and in the course of time, when we use 
appropriate technical means, we will live indefinitely, unless we decide to end our lives 
ourselves in the act of suicide. Nevertheless death is still a requisite for man, but it does not 
mean that one should not take care of the quality of the extended existence, life that brings 
satisfaction (Ziemiński, 2010, p. 418).  
In this case, we deal with two aspects of the problem: 1) Do we undertake medico-
technical activities to improve the individual well-being of specific people suffering from 
some dysfunction? 2) Do we have in mind interferences in the body related to the 
modification of human nature; then we assume a longer period of such impact. These are two 
different issues, although related to each other. It is easier for us to accept interventions in the 
individual life of a person with congenital defects, or a person who has lost “natural” abilities, 
than to accept activities that would permanently change the human condition. 
In discussions on this subject, we return to the classic term “human nature”, which in this 
case is to set the boundaries of such interference, or indicate the duties that we have towards 
human nature, for example engagement in activities to defend people against civilizational 
threats, or ascertainment of their improvement. In both cases we deal with understanding of 
human life as a certain value. Then, on the one hand, we consider what is good or bad for our 
lives, and on the other hand we indicate what is better or worse for a human being. In the 
latter case, in the argument “from an inclined plane” we analyze how much a given kind of 
interference in the human body will bring more or less benefits or losses in the overall balance 
of the actions of medicine and technology. This, of course, is only a prediction that we cannot 
be absolutely sure about, but we are morally obligated to make such a reflection (Wojewoda, 
2017, pp. 128–132). 
 
Death and mortality 
The term “mortality” is derived from “death”, but it reveals to us a different scope of 
axiological references. Awareness of existence is associated with the awareness of the loss of 
goods that are in our possession at a given time and to which we are attached, and often we 
cannot imagine life without them. The loss of goods convinces us of their importance, and 
among these goods life is a basic value, it is difficult to realize any other values without it. 
The discovery of mortality reveals one of the basic questions for a human being, that is, the 
question of the sense of individual and collective existence. Human existence in the world is 
being-towards-death, being temporarily finite. To understand our own life, we have to rethink 
the question of our finitude (Heidegger, 1994, pp. 332–334).  
The question about the meaning of life can mean different things, but it basically indicates 
the attitude of man to the structure of the world of values. This structure is the source point of 
reference for human choices; it is associated with a certain type of existential experience. The 
experience of mortality reveals to us further episodes of losing something important to us: 
health, impairment of cognition, loss of vitality, exhaustion of the potential of life activities, 
or “small deaths”, which ultimately bring us closer to the factual death.  
In the philosophical view of man’s death and mortality one can take a 1) nihilistic position 
– death ends our lives and there is no point in analyzing the fate of man after death, 2) 
idealistic – based on the belief that man is the composition of the body and soul, after death of 
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the body the soul takes on another body, or goes to a “different” world and maintains 
consciousness of being, 3) realistic – considers human mortality as a basic aspect of his 
functioning in the world, when the discovery of finitude allows man to become aware of the 
specificity and distinctiveness of his existence (Čáp & Palenčár, 2012, pp. 158–161). In 
realistic terms, mortality understood as a belief – “not yet”, is associated with the experience 
of contingency of existence of things, relationships with relatives and ourselves. Awareness of 
finitude may be associated with awareness of dying – the fact that my death or the death of a 
loved one is not distant in time, nevertheless, it is not a necessary relationship. This awareness 
may result from a metaphysical reflection on the evanescence of man (Glaser & Strauss, 
2016, pp. 11–19). 
The French philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch wrote about three aspects of human 
mortality included in the context of reference to the subject: death in the first, second and 
third person. Death in the first person (the death of “I”) is the most absurd thing, going 
beyond the limits of understanding. We do not remember the moment when we did not live. 
The consciousness of our “I” is connected with life. Plato, who argued for the existence of the 
soul before its connection with the body, appealed to the metaphor of forgetting – the soul 
forgot the knowledge resulting from watching eternal ideas. Therefore, later you have to 
remind it (anamnesis), or undertake the task of consistent acquisition of knowledge of reality 
(Jankélévitch, 1993, pp. 64–75). 
Unfortunately, we do not know if our “life after death” will also be associated with 
individual consciousness. Collective consciousness does not guarantee the separateness of our 
“I”. In this case, one can refer to the theological argument, based on the concept of 
separateness of persons in the Holy Trinity. The separation of God the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit for human beings would also guarantee the separateness of existence after 
biological death (Wanldenfels, 1993, p. 86). At the level of philosophical reflection, Epicurus’ 
argument is best known, which, without referring to the concept of the immortal soul, claimed 
that when we live, death is gone, and when death comes, we are gone. Death enters the limits 
of the rational, only the fear of death remains. Here, philosophy is useful, the task of which is 
to make man happy despite the fear he feels (Epikur, 1984, p. 645). Epicurus’ argument is not 
applicable to the fear of loss of a loved one, but only to the aspect of death that concerns for 
us.  
This indicates the second dimension of understanding death or the death of another person. 
Mourning after losing someone with whom the subject was emotionally bound makes us left 
with inner emptiness that cannot be filled with anything. It is grief and sadness that can last 
for a very long time, even till the end of the life of the person who has suffered such a loss. 
The death of someone close to us is comparable to our own death. At a given moment, it 
seems that nothing will restore the person we have lost forever. In contemporary 
philosophical and psychological discourse, a lot of attention is devoted to this aspect of 
mortality, mainly to suggest some form of therapy to people who have lost a loved one and 
cannot return to normal functioning. 
Death in the third person is an abstract and anonymous death. It has a media character, we 
know that people are dying, but it does not affect the rhythm of our lives. Death in this case is 
an object that can be analyzed by distancing ourselves from it. It can be examined from the 
demographic, medical and cultural side. We are accustomed to this aspect of death, and the 
universality of media coverage makes us neutral towards it. Showing images of death in the 
media does not make us sympathetic; instead, it makes us voyeurs of someone’s misfortune. 
You cannot blame the media for it, but thanks to media “peeping” others, it ceases to be an 
individual phenomenon and becomes an element of entertainment. Paradoxically, waiting for 
more reports about an unfortunate accident, the consequences of a terrorist attack, may be 
similar to looking forward the next episode of an interesting series. 
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This, however, is not indifferent to what images of death we see, or what the premises for 
our cultural associations regarding dying are. Photographs, and to, a greater extent movies, 
subtract feelings from the description of events. Admittedly, photos exaggerate misfortune, 
but it is not associated with a feeling of greater threat from the viewers of the movie or 
information program. Photography can capture someone’s death or show the moment shortly 
before it. This view of dying arouses great curiosity among the viewers which is why it is 
often shown in the media. In this sense, it teaches us a certain indifference to the misfortune 
of others. According to Susan Sontag, photography is a tool for depersonalization of our 
attitude to the world. We are afraid of death, but in the visual context it is intriguing and 
arouses curiosity. The misfortunes of others make our misfortunes more tolerable or more 
distant in time and space (Sontag, 2016, pp. 73–75). 
The feeling that the misfortune viewed in the media does not concern the viewer is fueling 
interest in images of the suffering of other people who are anonymous to us. As a 
consequence, watching images of death blurs the boundary between the report from events 
and film or television fiction. Therefore viewing death image can please the average media 
recipient; allow them to become part of the evening entertainment. However, victims of 
persecution immortalized in photographs accuse us of our indifference. Images that we watch 
about death leave us indifferent, affect our axiological sensitivity, make us more or less 
sensitive to death. Sometimes they cause embarrassment in the viewer and sometimes 
unhealthy curiosity. They can also cause fear that the threat to life becomes something real. 
In the opinion of the French philosopher and sociologist Jean Baudrillard, the sight of 
unhappiness can lead to attitudes and behaviors opposite to those described earlier. They 
might be based on solidarity and kindness towards the victims. In this sense, good may be the 
result of a human reaction to social evil or evil resulting from the circumstances of the 
destructive action of the forces of nature. It can also teach greater caution in making decisions 
that pose a threat to our security (Baudrillard, 2009, pp. 98–101). 
 
Axiology of mortality 
All human choices are related to the world of values, there are no axiologically indifferent 
activities. What, then, is the world of values? This is not the place to consider the dispute over 
the existence of values. However, fundamental decisions regarding this dispute refer to two 
positions: objectivism or axiological subjectivism. The third position is also possible, 
according to which, values are useless cultural fiction. I will not consider this view because no 
axiology can be based on it. As part of the assumption of axiological objectivity, values are 
independent of the subject, while according to the second position, values are created by an 
individual entity or by a cultural group. The author of the article is a proponent of the 
moderate version of objectivism, which he describes as axiological structure or axiological 
relationalism. According to it, values are independent of the subject; people, things, events are 
carriers of values. Man learns values; it takes place through internal experience and through 
intellectual reflection. We know nothing about the non-human experience of the world of 
values. Values are a kind of filter through which we make self-reflection, we refer to other 
people and objects from our environment.  
Values are associated with a specific cultural context, but this connection does not concern 
the question of existence, but the specificity of their reading. This means that values can be 
read differently in a historical, cultural and social context, but also in relation to certain types 
of existential experiences. Values are not objects, but a certain type of relationship, the 
intensity of experiencing them depends on their comparison with other values. For example, 
the value of freedom, which is particularly valued by modern culture, will be interpreted in a 
different way depending whether we link it with independence from oppressive political 
power or whether we associate freedom with responsibility. In a sense, the position of 
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relationism was represented in German philosophy by Nicolai Hartmann, and Roman 
Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz and Tadeusz Czeżowski in Polish philosophy 
(Wiśniewski, 2013, pp. 34–35). 
Values constitute a certain relationship, impossible to calculate, it is impossible to create a 
closed table of values and a measurable number of references, in this sense they do not fit into 
any system. Using the term “values system” we only talk about the cultural ordering of 
values, there are many ways of ordering it, they depend on the historical, cultural, religious 
and institutional context, for example in this way we speak about liberal and Christian values. 
The values structure is the basis of the communication code we use when exchanging 
information, interpersonal dialogue between interlocutors, models of description and ordering 
of reality. Dialogue concerns many situations, but if we are eager to reach an agreement and 
cooperation, we do it by referring to similarly understood values. Relationships between 
values have a network character, and there are a lot of possible configurations within the 
general axiological structure. The metaphor of the “communication network” works well here 
because the world of values is a multidimensional and diverse system of connections that we 
can consider on many ontic levels. 
The intensity of axiological experiences depends on the situation in which the subject is 
located. One of these situations is related to the boundary experience of the inevitability of 
death. You can check in what sense you are aware of your mortality, suffering, guilt, fight – 
“borderline situations” (Jaspers, 1973, pp. 201–210). In Karl Jaspers’ concept, these situations 
are connected with the process of becoming human existence – we become ourselves when 
we encounter borderline situations. The author of the article assumes that borderline situations 
affect the experience of meeting the world of values. 
Awareness of mortality is waiting for a specific point in time, but ignorance concerning 
this moment can become a general premise of fear of death. It may be the loss of a loved one. 
We are witnesses of the deaths of people who accompanied us – grandparents, parents, 
spouses, children, friends, people with whom we had bonds of love and friendship. As a rule, 
this is related to the experience of suffering, a sense of irreversible loss, regret, depression. 
We lose an important part of ourselves with them, the part that was associated with deceased 
people (Wieczorek, 2004, pp. 20–21). Suffering resulting from the awareness of the end of 
existence is associated with sadness, but in principle it can become an important pretext to 
discover the sense of existence. The question about sense in a borderline situation has an 
indispensable axiological dimension, from the perspective of death we ask about the value of 
life and its dimensions, which used to seem and still seem important, or lose their validity. 
When we talk about axiology of mortality, we can point to two aspects of this issue: negative 
and positive. The former is connected with the state of weakening or undermining the will to 
live. Human experience in this respect is diverse, it concerns: 
Realization of the impermanence of existence in the biological and social dimension – 
especially when we think about our own life and our relationships with our relatives. From the 
perspective of the impermanence of existence, we see the value of our life, the value of family 
relationships, friendly relationships and commitment to typical life activities, participation in 
forms of community life in a different light. They appear to us as something particularly 
valuable, which should be cherished. 
This may lead to an axiological error – a special concentration on vital and hedonistic 
values, marginalization of the value of another axiological area (level), for example those that 
indicate the dimension of spiritual life – moral, aesthetic. It is expressed in the disagreement 
and non-accepting attitude to the biological aspects of aging, and as a consequence, the 
creation of medical and cultural forms of denial of old age – plastic surgery, or consolation – 
“your age is determined by how you feel”. 
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Impermanence indicates the transitory character of civilizational, political and scientific 
theories. Thus with a certain intensity, we look at the value of truth in the historical context, 
credibility of scientific theories, or the value of power in relation to the freedom of citizens. 
The dominance of instrumental and pragmatic values over those resulting from the attitude of 
selflessness and generosity is customarily suggested then. 
Discoveries of body and mind limitations affect the belief that the subject is not able to get 
to know everything; he cannot acquire many physical and intellectual skills he wants. To 
avoid frustration, he must master the art of enjoying small successes and minor pleasures. A 
man who discovers this type of his own “impotence” is prone to resentment in the sense in 
which this concept was used by Max Scheler that is, undermining the sense of realizing those 
values that the subject cannot materialize. For example, when he cannot acquire knowledge 
on a given topic, he undermines the value of education in this area. The liberating factor in 
this case would be the ability to show respect for those who realize values the subject cannot 
realize (Scheler, 1977, pp. 65–68).  
Mortality is the discovery of impermanence of human memory. On the one hand, it is 
based on awareness that the memory of the deceased does not last long. A lot depends on the 
type and intensity of emotional relationships that connect the deceased to his loved ones, and 
the length of his and their lives. On the other hand, the subject may consider the dilemma of 
Homeric Achilles, whether to choose a short and famous life, or long and anonymous one. 
Life that is biologically short but full of glory can be a reason for the descendants to 
remember, even after the three thousand years that have passed since the Trojan War, thanks 
to Homer, we still remember Achilles. The persistence of memory in this case is primarily due 
to the fact that Greek literature has been a canonical element of an educated European for 
many centuries. 
The passing of things and people also affects the world of values. Impermanence (mortality 
of things and people) solidifies the belief about the relativity of all aspects of life, including 
the relativity of values themselves. This argument is also used by axiological subjectivists, 
considering that the establishment and convention determine the constitutive features of the 
existence of values. They depend on factors such as culture, biology or collective will – social 
contract. 
In a positive aspect, when we associate mortality as an expression of finitude with the 
world of values, then other aspects of understanding values emerge: Awareness of mortality 
leads to a re-evaluation of values, for example, the discovery of the validity of those values 
that had been neglected until now, or treated as secondary. Specifically, the “revaluing of 
values” has been adopted through the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, but fits well with the 
axiological context in question. Changing the validity in this case may be a crucial aspect of 
internal development – transitions from the development model related to the acquisition of 
new competences, the accumulation of intellectual and physical skills to the model understood 
as work on broadening subjective consciousness – metaphorically referred to as “the path into 
yourself” or expanding the range of responsibility for a new scope of affairs or for those 
around us. This type of attitude stems from concern about what will remain after me. We have 
in mind the influence on bringing up children, or creating something that will be remembered. 
Awareness of mortality can change lifestyle, nutrition, and time management strategies, for 
example when it comes to establishing new proportions between commitment to family life 
and work. Awareness of mortality may lead to greater care for the efficiency of the body, 
brisk functioning of the mind, maintaining the “quality of life” at a satisfactory level, care for 
the satisfying relationship with loved ones. 
An important consequence of recognizing your own mortality may be the need to 
appreciate the importance of mindfulness. Life in a “hurry” makes us insensitive to some kind 
of axiological experience. The validity (value) of certain things and activities is revealed 
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when we are watching reality at a slower pace (for example the value of working on 
ourselves), or when we are able to see a given thing from another, unconventional side (for 
example the value of harmony and order in nature). Exercise in mindfulness is, in a sense, an 
exercise of the mind, axiological sensitivity associated with moral or aesthetic competence, 
but also will, or courage in making difficult decisions. Lack of such sensitivity makes our 
experiences superficial, and meeting other people becomes hasty in its character and based on 
empty “talk”. 
Death understood as “pushing” man into nothingness reveals to us the problem of memory 
– both individual and collective. The memory of our past can be recorded on the carrier of 
immortal soul, in social memory, material artifacts – in the products of human work, and now 
it can become a digital record placed in the resources of the network. The question of who I 
am is not only a question about self-determination, but also about the value of my own “I” – 
for me, my relatives, the people with whom I work, whom we identify with the supernatural 
power for the protection of the world (God). The conviction about the value of life is the 
conviction of its reasonableness; volitional and intellectual movement within the structure of 
the world of values determines the horizon of meaning and the proportions of involvement in 
various forms of life activities. 
Finally, you can consider the topic of the death of values themselves, that is, life in a world 
where values have been forgotten. This, however, seems impossible, because it would be a 
life of total indeterminacy, equating all things, human choices and events with each other. It 
would also mean the death of the symbolic space for information exchange. We would 
become consumers of things that do not matter to us, events that we cannot understand. We 
get lost in various contexts of self-creation. By adopting the illusory conviction that each 
entity is the creator of a separate structure of values – the consequences of the axiological 
subjectivist position, we get a completely useless communication tool, such as creating 
private mathematics. 
In order to negotiate the ways of interpreting the world of values, we must assume that the 
negotiation itself and the value of the agreement connected with it constitute a universal 
value. Diagnoses announcing the death of values in the space of symbolic exchange, however, 
seem to be exaggerated. This kind of critical evaluation of modern axiology of reversed 
meanings can be read, among others, in statements by Jean Baudrillard who, when describing 
the state of modern globalized culture, wrote that we are now dealing with a specific 
perversity of meanings – “reversibility of gift in the counter gift, reversibility of exchange in 
sacrifice, reversibility of time within a cycle, reversibility of production in destruction, 
reversibility of life in death, reversibility of every language rule and linguistic value” 
(Baudrillard, 2007, p. 12). 
According to the author of the article, the diagnosis of the death of values is exaggerated, 
because the structure of the world of values as such cannot be destroyed. One can, at most, 
talk about the crisis of a certain model of understanding values, for example, Christian values 
or the value of the liberal culture of the West, in some sense it can be assumed that Islamic 
culture is also experiencing some crisis. In essence, values are relationships that are 
something accompanying an individual subject, something that is before the subject even 
starts to think of or wants to destroy. The relationship to death is a test of our humanity. When 
referring to one’s own and the mortality of others, we can check to what extent we are on the 
side of those values whose implementation requires from us personal courage, such as 
honesty, justice, openness, or the ability to work uncompromisingly, in situations posing a 
threat to other people’s life or health. 
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